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Abstract
Agent-based models are versatile tools for studying how societal opinion change, including political polarization
and cultural diffusion, emerges from individual behavior. This study expands agents’ psychological realism using
empirically-motivated rules governing interpersonal influence, commitment to previous beliefs, and conformity
in social contexts. Computational experiments establish that these extensions produce three novel results: (a)
sustained “strong” diversity of opinions across society, (b) opinion subcultures, and (c) pluralistic ignorance.
These phenomena arise from a combination of agents’ intolerance, susceptibility and conformity, with extremist
agents and social networks playing important roles. The distribution and dynamics of simulated opinions
reproduce two empirical datasets on Americans’ political opinions.
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Introduction
Opinions are mutable: individuals revise their beliefs through
social interaction, personal experience, and reflection, while
societal norms shift in response to global events and public
opinion. Opinion change at the individual and societal scales
interact to produce political polarization, cultural globaliza-
tion, and other important social trends. To understand these
phenomenon and design appropriate interventions, we need
quantitative tools that simulate the psychological and social as-
pects of opinion change. For example, models of interpersonal
communication will help activists organize grassroots support,
help leaders design effective campaigns, and help peacekeep-
ers prevent the spread of extremism. Computational models of
opinion change have studied the relationship between polariza-
tion, social influence, and political intolerance [1, 2, 3, 4, 5],
while models of cultural diffusion have improved our under-
standing of cultural convergence [6, 7], subculture formation
[8, 9], and cultural stability within organizations [10, 11].
Building multi-level, quantitative, predictive models of
opinion change is challenging because opinions arise from
a multitude of neurological, psychological, and social pro-
cesses. Empirically, the extent to which people are persuaded
by each others’ subjective evaluations depends on numerous
factors, including previous beliefs and a desire to minimize
cognitive dissonance [12]; motivations to be accurate, self-
consistent, and socially accepted [13, 14]; issue framing, emo-
tional arousal, and cognitive elaboration [15]; self-esteem
[16]; social norms [17]; and more. Mathematical and compu-
tational models help formally investigate both the interplay
of internal psychological forces and the feedback between
opinion change and social influence among many individuals.
Unfortunately, models have historically neglected important
elements of social psychology, assuming that individuals be-
have identically, rationally, or with perfect information. This
raises questions about whether their results properly inform
our understanding of human societies.
Agent-based models (ABMs) seek to explain macroscopic
outcomes by showing that artificial societies populated by
psychologically-plausible software individuals can, when ini-
tialized in a virtual environment and evolved through time, en-
dogenously “grow” complex social phenomenon [18]. Three
features of ABMs make them ideal for modeling opinion
change. First, agents are autonomous and heterogeneous:
each individual has distinct internal attributes, such as an in-
tolerance of opposing views, a propensity to socially conform,
or a tendency towards stubbornness. Second, agents can be
psychologically and cognitively authentic, endowed with ra-
tional, emotional, and social thinking of arbitrary complexity
[19]. Third, agents interact locally in an explicitly defined
space: individuals have incomplete information about the
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world, and interact in social networks of plausible size and
composition, causing influence to spread through society in a
manner constrained by personal connections.
Although a rich literature of opinion dynamics using ABMs
already exists [1, 20, 2, 3, 21, 22, 4, 23, 6, 7], several impor-
tant questions remain unanswered:
1. How do social groups maintain a diversity of opin-
ions? Previous models have shown that when agents
exchange interpersonal influence, their opinions either
converge to a single value (consensus) or diverge to
homogeneous opinion groups (polarization). Although
consensus and polarization are important political and
cultural trends, real societies never converge or diverge
absolutely: diversity is always preserved. Surprisingly,
models have not yet shown that such a distribution can
persist.
2. Will subcultures of opinions survive in a well-connected
society? Pockets of extreme opinions exist within mod-
erate real-world societies. Although such subcultures
have emerged in previous models, they survive only be-
cause of psychologically-implausible rules that curtail
any interpersonal influence.
3. Does pluralistic ignorance affect societal opinion change?
The views we express in public often differ from those
we hold privately. This situation undoubtedly affects in-
dividual and societal opinion dynamics, yet falsification
remains unstudied in computational models.
4. Can an opinion change model reproduce empirical
data? Opinion dynamics models capture qualitative
phenomenon like polarization and clustering, but are
rarely validated with quantitative empirical data. Clos-
ing the loop will increase the scientific credibility and
predictive power of these models.
In this study, I aim to answer these questions by studying
the relationship between the social psychology of personal
opinion change and the distributions, dynamics, and geog-
raphy of opinions across society. In Section 2, I review the
literature on the social and psychological forces that drive
opinion change. In Section 3, I describe the model, explaining
how it extends previous models by expanding the psychologi-
cal realism of agents. In Section 4, I pose hypotheses about
the relationship between psychological forces and societal
opinion change, run computational experiments to test them,
and describe the emergence of (a) strong societal diversity,
(b) persistent subcultures of opinions, and (c) pluralistic ig-
norance. In Section 5, I compare these results with empirical
data on Americans’ political opinions. I conclude by summa-
rizing the major findings, suggesting extensions to the model,
and proposing a research agenda for agent models in the social
sciences.
Social Psychology of Opinion Change
Social influence is a process in which the social exchange of
information causes individuals to reevaluate their own opin-
ions on a subjective issue. Arguably the most important
feature of social influence is homophily, the principle that
contact between similar people occurs more frequently and
has greater impact than contact between dissimilar people.
Empirical evidence for homophily and its effects on social
influence abounds: for an overview, see [24]. Interpersonal in-
fluence among friends is known to engender common attitudes
[25, 26, 27], while the strength of dyadic connections concur-
rently increases with similarity [10, 28]. On the other hand,
interactions can impart negative social influence if opinions
differ greatly [29, 30], causing individuals to adopt more ex-
treme attitudes when exposed to counterattitudinal arguments
[31, 32, 33].
Homophily is a cornerstone of opinion dynamics mod-
els: individuals exert social influence on each other propor-
tional to their ideological similarity. In dyadic conversations,
similarity encourages consensus, while dissimilarity fosters
polarization. A lineage of models have shown that a society
with high tolerance (a parameter governing the relationship
between opinion similarity and the magnitude of influence)
leads to consensus, while low tolerance leads to polarization
[2, 3, 1, 20, 21, 22, 4, 23, 6, 7]. Weak diversity, defined
as the convergence of opinions to n > 1 attractor states, can
be maintained when opinion subcultures form and become
isolated. This outcome is common in bounded confidence
models when influence between dissimilar agents goes to
zero. Generally, strong diversity, defined as a smooth distri-
bution of opinions along a continuous ideological spectrum,
disappears in these models whenever social networks are fully
connected [11, 34, 35], even accounting for noise and other
minor deviations [36, 37].
Social influence does not take place in a vacuum, but in an
environment filled by people who seek social acceptance and
who judge each other upon personality and beliefs. Confor-
mity describes an individual’s desire to gain social approval
and avoid rejection by expressing normative beliefs. There
is substantial empirical evidence of people misrepresenting
their true beliefs [13, 14, 38], though some “anticonformists”
will express non-normative beliefs so as to appear more dis-
tinct [35, 39]. Together, conformity and distinctiveness lead
to pluralistic ignorance [40], a condition in which the true
distribution of opinions in society differs from what is spoken
and heard in public. Pluralistic ignorance makes people un-
aware of others’ true beliefs; a lack of accurate information
can, though the mechanisms of social influence, feedback
to change people’s true opinions. For example, after years
government oppression, levels of popular dissent in author-
itarian societies may become suddenly obvious, leading to
political turmoil and violent tipping points [41, 42]. Despite
current enthusiasm for studying the effects of conformity and
distinctiveness on opinion change [43, 35, 44], ABMs have
yet to investigate the repercussions of agents’ explicit belief
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falsification on public opinion.
The way an individual receives and internalizes others’
beliefs can be as important as the content and context of the
influence. People who hold strong opinions are committed
to their beliefs: they resist opinion change, because it would
challenge their political worldview and induce cognitive disso-
nance, and because they judge contrary information as invalid
due to confirmation bias [45]. Strongly opinionated individu-
als have been shown to reject opinions contrary to their own
belief and even become more extreme. On the other hand,
moderately opinionated individuals are susceptible to opin-
ion change and will more readily internalize beliefs presented
by others [31, 32, 33]. Surprisingly, few models of opinion
change have looked into how susceptibility and commitment
help sustain diversity and prevent homogenization of small
cultural groups [5].
Finally, the social networks through which individuals in-
teract determine how opinion change spreads through society.
These networks can be characterized by statistical descriptions
such as the degree of connectivity (average size of a social net-
work); real-world networks have positive assortativity (people
with large networks tend to know others with large networks),
low whole-network density (most people don’t know each
other), and high but heterogeneous clustering. Though sim-
ulations have confirmed that the size and composition of so-
cial networks strongly affect opinion change, their outcomes
vary widely with the models’ assumptions about the network
[46, 47], which rarely take these empirical regularities into
account. One procedure which does effectively reproduce
these statistics is the social circle model [48], which is easily
incorporated into an ABM framework [49].
The Influence, Susceptibility, and
Conformity Model (ISC)
To summarize, agents are randomly placed within a two-
dimensional space. Each agent has a unique initial opinion,
three parameters for tolerance, conformity, and susceptibil-
ity, and a social network. Each round, every agent initiates
a dialogue with members of his social network. In the dia-
logue, each agent expresses an opinion that reflects his true
opinion, his conformity, and the opinions already expressed
in the dialogue. Afterwards, the initiating agent updates his
true opinion based on his tolerance, susceptibility, and the
expressed opinions’ weighted influence. The model records
the true and expressed opinion of each agent after every round.
The model, data, and figures are available on GitHub.
Agents’ opinions, interpreted as beliefs on a single subjec-
tive issue, lie on a continuous 0−100 scale. Initial opinion,
tolerance, conformity, susceptibility, and social reach are all
drawn from normal distributions whose means and variances
are specified in each experiment. Agents are randomly as-
signed a continuously-valued (x,y) location, then each agent
creates a social network N with all agents within euclidean
radius equal to his social reach r, as per the social circle model.
Agents remain stationary.
Agent i initiates a dialogue with all agents j in his social
network. He is the first to express an opinion, and always
voices his true opinion (Oi). Subsequently, each j distorts his
opinion in order to conform or appear distinct. Specifically,
j calculates the average of all opinions (Ek) expressed so
far in the dialogue (D), then expresses an opinion (E j) that
is between his true opinion (O j) and the dialogue’s opinion
norm (conformity), or that is distanced by some amount from
the dialogue’s norm (distinctiveness):
E j = O j +
c j
k j
∗ 1
N
D
∑
k
(Ek−O j) (1)
The agent parameter c j represents an agent’s inherent willing-
ness to misrepresent his beliefs in social contexts in order to
appear either normal or distinct. The parameter captures both
conformity (c j > 0) and distinctiveness (c j < 0). Greater
magnitude c j produces greater belief falsification: c j = 0
causes the agent to speak truthfully, c j = 1 causes the agent to
express the dialogue’s “mean opinion”, and c =−1 causes the
agent to express an opinion that is more dislike the mean than
his true opinion. In this model, conformity and distinctiveness
are manifest in expression but not directly in opinion change:
agents attempt to gain social favor by stating opinions that dif-
fer from their true beliefs, but do not change their true beliefs
to reflect this posturing.
The extent of j’s conformity is further mitigated by his cur-
rent commitment k j, which is proportional to his susceptibility
s j and the extremeness of his current opinion:
k j = 1+ s j ∗ |50−O j|50 . (2)
The susceptibility parameter s j represents an agent’s inherent
commitment to strong beliefs; it causes him to be less affected
by social context and social influence. Its magnitude governs
how a departure from a neutral opinion (Oi = 50) translates to
a shrinking of influence: higher values result in less opinion
change.
After each j has expressed E j once in the dialogue, i
updates his true opinion according to the dialogue’s influence
(Ii), which is proportional to each E j and the weight that i
assigns to that expression (wi j):
Ii =
∑Nj wi j ∗ (E j−Oi)
∑Nj |wi j|
(3)
Conceptually, the dialogue’s influence Ii results from i being
pulled towards (or pushed away from) each opinion expressed
in the dialogue, E j, by an amount proportional to the intera-
gent weight, wi j. The weight, in turn, is calculated according
to homophily: the greater the absolute distance between i’s
opinion and j’s expression, the more negative the weight, and
the less influence j’s expression will exert on i’s opinion:
wi j = 1− ti |E j−Oi|50 (4)
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where ti represents i’s inherent intolerance of dissimilar opin-
ions. Its magnitude dictates how strongly a given opinion
difference translates to a loss of interagent weight. A high
value implies that an agent will only assign positive weight
to opinions that are similar to his own beliefs; a low value
implies the agent will be positively influenced by a wider
range of opinions. Mathematically, ti is the slope of i’s weight
vs. ∆ opinion curve, which is continuous and linear. This is a
departure from the canonical bounded confidence approach, in
which weight is a threshold function of an agent’s intolerance
εi. I believe continuous weighting better reflects the subtleties
of opinion appraisal and social influence than a binary “full
acceptance vs. complete disregard” judgment. This approach
has also been adopted by [35]. Weights are bounded from −1
to +1.
Finally, i updates his true opinion based on his previous
opinion and the dialogue’s influence, scaled by his commit-
ment:
Oi,t+1 = Oi,t +
Ii
ki
(5)
This process is repeated for each i in the population, conclud-
ing one timestep.
I use four metrics to investigate the diversity, dynamics,
and geography of opinions within the population. Opinion
histograms plot the frequency of opinions across the ideolog-
ical spectrum at particular times, and are the most complete
measure of strong vs. weak diversity. Opinion trajectories plot
each agent’s history as a line on a opinion vs. time graph, and
are used to study dynamics towards or away from diversity.
To distinguish different regions of opinion space, I use the
terms centrist to describe agents who hold (33 < Oi < 66),
moderate to describe agents with moderately-strong opin-
ions (16 < Oi < 33 or 66 < Oi < 83), and extremist to de-
scribe agents with the strongest opinions (0 < Oi < 16 or
83 < Oi < 100). Spatial maps plot each agent as a circle in
(x,y) space with color representing the agent’s opinion, and
can help identify subgroup formation and regions of ideologi-
cal mixing. Finally, the Jensen-Shannon Divergence (JSD)
is a measure of the similarity of true opinions and expressed
opinions across society. The JSD quantifies pluralistic igno-
rance and is used to study how agents’ falsifications affects
the diversity of opinions within society. It is calculated from
the Kullback–Leibler divergence D(P||Q), a standard entropy
metric for probability distributions:
JSD(P||Q) = 1
2
D(P||M)+ 1
2
D(Q||M) (6)
where P and Q are the true and expressed opinion distributions,
M = 12 (P+Q), and
D(P||Q) =∑
i
P(i) log
P(i)
Q(i)
. (7)
The JSD ranges from 0 (identity) to 1 (minimum mutual in-
formation)
Results
Experiment 1: Social Influence and Intolerance
To begin, I reproduce a classical experiment in opinion dy-
namics, in which the final distribution of opinions is examined
as a function of intolerance. In this model, intolerance is an
agent-level parameter ti which is initially drawn from a normal
distribution of mean µt and variance σt . For these prelimi-
nary experiments I assume no heterogeneity of intolerance,
susceptibility, or conformity: σt ,σs,σc = 0.
Hypothesis 1: low intolerance promotes societal opinion
convergence, while high intolerance produces opinion
polarization and weak diversity.
In a society with low intolerance, µt = 0.7, most agents assign
positive weight to each others’ opinions during dialogues, and
are consequently pulled towards the mean opinion in that dia-
logue. Figure 1 (left) shows that an initial normal distribution
of opinions, µO = 50,σO = 20, rapidly converges to a single,
centrist opinion: given enough time, diversity will completely
disappear, and all agents will believe Oi = 50. Conversely, in
a society with high intolerance, µt = 1.0, many agents assign
negative weight to each others’ opinions and are pushed away
from the dialogue mean. As agents adopt stronger opinions,
they assign stronger negative weights, resulting in polarizing
feedback. Figure 1 (right) shows this society rapidly diverges
to two extremists opinions at either end of the opinion spec-
trum. As t→ ∞ only weak diversity remains: all agents either
hold Oi = 0 or Oi = 100. These base-case results confirm
the classical finding that, in the absence of other psychologi-
cal forces, the degree of individuals’ intolerance determines
whether society homogenizes or polarizes.
Experiment 2: Conformity and Distinctiveness
Next I introduce social context into the simulation by allow-
ing agents to misrepresent their true opinions in dialogues.
Though opinion falsification does not directly affect agents’
true opinion update, it does affect the information available to
those agents. If falsification is significant, agents will perceive
an unrepresentative distribution of opinions (compared to each
others’ true beliefs) and change their beliefs accordingly.
Hypothesis 2: a conformist society will homogenize under
conditions that otherwise cause polarization, while a society
driven by distinctiveness will polarize under conditions that
otherwise favor consensus.
First, I simulate a society whose high intolerance would
normally cause polarization, µt = 1.0, but introduce a moder-
ate tendency towards social conformity, µc = 0.5. Conform-
ing agents now express opinions that are close enough to the
dialogue mean that almost nobody assigns these (falsified)
opinions a negative weight. Agents adopt opinions closer to
the norms expressed in the dialogue, and opinions converge,
eventually resulting in societal consensus as shown in Figure
2 (right). Second, I simulate the opposite conditions: a society
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Figure 1. A society populated by agents who initially hold normally distributed opinions converges to a single centrist opinion
if agents’ intolerance of dissimilar opinions is low, and diverges to two extremists opinion if agents’ intolerance is high. This
result reproduces findings in classical opinion dynamics and represents the base case of the simulation, in which social
influence is the only active psychological force and all agents are identically intolerant. Additional runs show that societies
with intolerance below µt = 0.7 always converge, societies with intolerance above µt = 1.0 always diverge, and societies in
between can either converge or diverge, depending on initial conditions. Strong diversity doesn’t emerge.
whose low intolerance would normally cause convergence,
µt = 0.7, but filled with agents who possess a strong desire
to be distinct, µc = −1.5. When agents converse, they ex-
press opinions that differ radically from centrist norms. As
expressions become more extreme, social influence causes
agents to adopt and retain extreme beliefs. Figure 2 (left)
shows that opinions initially converge, then diverge towards
two homogeneous extremist parties. These results indicate
that contextual opinion falsification can reverse the effects of
intolerance, but cannot sustain strong diversity or pluralistic
ignorance.
Experiment 3: Commitment to Strong Beliefs
I conclude the preliminary experiments by investigating whether,
when agents’ susceptibility to influence decreases with their
belief extremity, different patterns of societal opinion change
emerge.
Hypothesis 3: when extremist agents undergo less opinion
change than moderate or centrist agents, their persistent
influence will prevent centrist homogenization and produce
weak diversity.
Beginning with the simple case of a tolerant society with
no opinion falsification, I test whether strong commitment,
µs = 10.0, can reverse trends towards convergence. The mean
opinion expressed in dialogues is still O¯ ' 50, but because
agents are tolerant and truthful, they assign positive weights to
all opinions they hear. Extreme agents undergo little opinion
change due to their commitment, but without a repelling force
to push them away from social norms (i.e. intolerance or dis-
tinctiveness), they are still pulled slowly towards this centrist
opinion. Although they remain steadfast in their views for
longer periods of time than in Experiment 1, they eventually
converge to a single centrist opinion like the rest of society
(not shown). This result contradicts Hypothesis 3, showing
that commitment by itself cannot reverse homophilous opin-
ion convergence.
However, personal susceptibility can affect a society that
is intolerant and conformist, which normally homogenizes
as in Experiment 2. Opinions initially converge due to the
strong centrist norms perceived in conformist social dialogues,
but extremists are slow to change. By t = 300, most agents
have adopted moderate or centrist opinions and expressions,
but about 2% of agents have, through intolerant repelling,
adopted maximally extreme opinions, as shown in Figure 3.
These extreme agents are now so committed to their beliefs
that they barely soften their expressions to socially conform,
Oi = 100→ Ei = 95, and their strongly opinionated vocaliza-
tions polarize their social networks. Over time, this influence
bifurcates society, as can be seen by the divergence of opin-
ions past t = 500. This experiment indicates that personal
commitment fosters pockets of extremism whose long-term
influence significantly alters societal opinion dynamics.
Experiment 4: Strong Diversity
Equipped with a basic understanding of model behavior and
the independent effects of intolerance, susceptibility, and com-
mitment, I now simulate societies in which all three psychoso-
cial forces interact. In this experiment, all agent parameters
are drawn from normal distributions with nonzero means and
variances, creating an artificial society with greater hetero-
geneity and psychological realism than previous opinion dy-
namics models.
Hypothesis 4: when agents are simultaneously motivated by
social influence, personal susceptibility, and social context of
varying degrees, society will (a) maintain a strong diversity of
opinions and (b) exhibit and pluralistic ignorance.
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Figure 2. When agents with low intolerance wish to appear distinct in social contexts, they express extremists beliefs in
dialogues, which eventually polarizes society and leaves weak, bimodal diversity. When agents with high intolerance are
motivated to socially conform, they express normative centrist views, causing society to converge to centrism.
First I examine a society which is on average tolerant
and conformist (µt = 0.7,µc = 0.4), but with enough diver-
sity to create some intolerant and distinction-seeking agents
(σt = 0.3,σc = 0.1). These forces tend to pull society towards
convergence. However, an opposing commitment to strong
beliefs (µs = 5.0,σs = 0.4) helps initially-extreme agents re-
sist normalization and locally exert polarizing influence. The
opinion trajectory plot in Figure 4 shows that society initially
converges, but scattered extremists retain their strong views.
Unlike in Experiment 3, where strong commitment kept ex-
tremists from softening their expressions, extremists in this
society moderate their expressions and few extreme opinions
are publicly voiced. This, combined with low extremist den-
sity, prevents radicals from attracting many followers: by
t = 1,000, less than 5% of the population holds or expresses
extreme views. However, these extremists exert enough influ-
ence that they keep centrist norms from completely homog-
enizing society. By t = 10,000, the distribution of opinions
and expressions have settled into a diverse centrist group,
a moderate fringe, and scattered extremists. This strongly
diverse distribution of opinions persists past t = 100,000 de-
spite small opinion fluctuations. A spatial map of opinions
shows that the diversity within the centrist party arises from
the minor influence exerted by extremists, which keeps the
surrounding neighborhoods to the ideological left and right of
O¯' 50. This result is, to my knowledge, the first evidence of
indefinitely-sustained strong diversity in a continuous-opinion
model.
Experiment 5: Opinion Subcultures
Next, I increase agents’ average intolerance and conformity
(µt = 1.0, µc = 0.5, µs = 5.0), then tweak their psychological
diversity (σt = 0.3, σs = 0.3, σc = 0.3). The results are shown
in Figure 5. After an initial period of convergence, several ex-
tremists neighborhoods develop, affecting partial polarization.
Society quickly self-organizes into distinct, geographically-
clustered opinion subcultures, as can be seen in the spatial
map. These subcultures are stable and coherent, but continue
to influence each other through persuadable agents on their
mutual border. Eventually, society settles into two extremist
groups and a centrist group. The spatial orientation of the
extremist parties is such that the centrist party receives ap-
proximately equal influence from both sides of the opinion
spectrum, and acts as a relatively stable buffer between the
two extremes.
Experiment 6: Pluralistic Ignorance
Pluralistic ignorance and unpredictable dynamics are also
possible under various conditions, such as when agents have
intermediate intolerance (µt = 0.8, σt = 0.3), low commit-
ment (µs = 0.1, σs = 0.1), and highly variable conformity
(µc = 0.3, σc = 0.5). Opinions converge early on, and soci-
ety is sufficiently tolerant and uncommitted that only a few
agents retain extreme opinions. Through some combination
of the extremists’ social influence, conformity of their neigh-
bors, and distinction of agents from centrist norms, opinions
throughout society begin drifting towards the extreme. How-
ever, unlike in Experiment 4, the extremists abruptly convert
to centrism, causing a dramatic turn towards convergence, Fig-
ure 6. Before these conversions, centrist or extremist agents
express moderate opinions in dialogues, and pluralistic igno-
rance spikes. The perceived moderate norm pulls centrists
towards extremism, causing the slow drift before t = 500
in the opinion trajectories, but also pulls extremists towards
centrism, causing the occasional conversion of an extremists
agent. If the former trend dominates, society bifurcates; if
the latter dominates, society homogenizes. Although this ex-
periment shows that strong diversity does not always persist
in the model, it suggests that pluralistic ignorance precedes
dramatic and sometimes nonlinear changes in societal opinion
dynamics.
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Figure 3. In a society filled with individuals who are intolerant, conformist, and committed to extreme beliefs, a minority of
agents will distance themselves from centrist norms and stubbornly express extremist views. The influence of these agents
polarizes their neighbors, spreading extremism spatially outward until society bifurcates into weak diversity. Spatial maps at
t = 200 and t = 2000 show that polarization originates from neighborhoods that contain extremist agents.
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Figure 4. When agents are motivated by social influence, personal susceptibility, and social context of heterogeneous strength,
novel opinion distributions emerge at the societal scale. The opinion trajectory shows that society settles into a stable opinion
configuration, while the opinion histogram confirms that the final distribution of opinions is strongly diverse. As confirmed by
the spatial map, most agents have adopted a centrist opinion, but a small minority of extremists counterbalance homogenizing
norms, preventing total convergence but exerting too little influence to bifurcate society
.
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Figure 5. Extremists counteract initial trends towards convergence and form neighborhoods of strongly (but uniquely)
opinionated agents. These groups compete on the border: when one group exerts greater influence, they persuade moderate
agents to become extremists; and when both groups exert equal influence, a buffer zone of centrist forms between them. These
strongly diverse subcultures persist through time without artificial geographic or social barriers to prevent communication.
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Figure 6. The conversion of influential extremists may shift the course of societal opinion change from polarization to
convergence. These events occur rapidly and are frequently preceded by spikes in pluralistic ignorance, such as at
t ' 500,1000,5800. This suggests that when sustained levels of opinion falsification are finally revealed, tipping-point
phenomenon may occur, leading to nonlinear opinion dynamics.
Experiment 7: Social Reach
Finally, I investigate whether strong diversity, opinion subcul-
tures, and pluralistic ignorance are robust to changes in the
size of agents’ social networks:
Hypothesis 5: small social networks will promote
geographically-distinct opinion subcultures while large social
networks will dissolve subgroups; strong diversity and
pluralistic ignorance will not be affected.
I reproduce Experiment 5 with smaller social networks, ob-
tained by reducing agents’ social reach (from µr = 22, σr = 4
to µr = 11, σr = 2). Opinions rapidly become clustered in
geographically-constrained networks, producing discrete sub-
cultures, Figure 7. These subcultures continue to receive
influence from surrounding networks, often through persuad-
able agents on the border who continually oppose consensus
and promote strong diversity within each subculture. The
partial isolation of subcultures prevents both homogenization
and polarization globally, which is reflected in a wide, mul-
timodal opinion distribution. Both opinion subcultures and
strong diversity remain stable past t = 5,000. Similar results
were obtained by reducing social reach in Experiments 4 and
6.
Conversely, increasing agents’ social reach promotes ho-
mogenization. Initially, most agent converge to centrism,
while the large size and strong centrist norms in dialogues en-
courage the remaining extremists to express moderate views.
Two outcomes are possible: either all extremists convert and
society converges to centrism; or, as shown in Figure 8, an
imbalance of extremists remains, and society drifts towards
the most vocal group. Unlike in Experiment 5, where a buffer
zone between extremist groups prevented takeover, large net-
works decrease the likelihood that centrists participate in dia-
logues that are well-balanced between the two extremes. This
increases the probability that the dominant group will exert the
strongest influence in all geographic regions, and that centrists
and moderates will turn towards that extreme. In either case,
strong diversity vanishes, in contradiction with Hypothesis 5.
Validation: American Political Opinions
Although the ISC model is grounded in social psychology
and reproduces features of real-world opinion dynamics like
strong diversity, opinion subcultures, and pluralistic ignorance,
I have not shown that it quantitatively captures real-world data.
In this section, I validate the model by reproducing empirical
data on the distributions and dynamics of political opinions in
American society.
As a proof-of-concept for strong diversity, I compare the
expressed opinion distributions produced by the ISC model
with a survey that assessed people’s opinions on each of
twelve issues in contemporary American politics [50]. Each
respondent was asked which of seven idealized positions,
ranging from extremely liberal to extremely conservative
statements about that issue, best described his or her belief,
creating a seven-point opinion scale. Using several parameter-
space exploration strategies, including an evolutionary algo-
rithm and hyperopt[51], I found values for mean intoler-
ance, susceptibility, and conformity that produced the dis-
tributions shown in Figure 9. These parameters, optimized
to reduce the root-mean-square-error between the model dis-
tribution and Broockman’s data over n = 4 realizations, lie
within the bounds of the values used in the above experiments
(except for σO = 50). The model captures distributions with
a variety of different shapes, including: normal distributions
around a centrist opinion (gun control) and a moderate opin-
ion (affirmative action); centrist dominance with an extreme
group (healthcare and contraception); and other strange shapes
(abortion and immigration, with less accuracy). This result
quantitatively demonstrates that real-world opinion distribu-
tions are within the output-space of the model.
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Figure 7. Shrinking agents’ social networks encourages the formation of geographically-organized opinion subcultures.
Reduced interaction between these groups prevents both centrist and extremist takeover, but continuing dialogues with
intermediary agents keeps these groups, and society as a whole, strongly diversity. Histograms and maps show opinions at
t = 10,000.
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Figure 8. Expanding agents’ social networks dilutes the influence of extremist agents over larger network, while globalized
influence prevents the formation of opinion subcultures and eventually destroys strong diversity. The spatial maps at t = 4,000
and t = 5,000 show that the buffer zone that previously preserved diversity no longer prevents the takeover of the dominant
extremist group.
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Figure 9. The ISC model produces expressed opinion distributions that align with American’s opinions on contemporary
political issues ranging from gun control to healthcare to immigration. Data reproduced with permission from [50], parameters
for each realization available on GitHub
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I also compare the model’s opinion dynamics with a large-
N, multi-year survey of American’s ideological consistency
conducted by the Pew Research Center [52]. The survey
consisted of ten questions assessing individuals’ attitudes
about current political issues such as “[the] size and scope
of government, the social safety net, immigration, homosex-
uality, business, the environment, foreign policy and racial
discrimination,” with each response coded −1 (liberal), +1
(conservative) , or 0 (don’t know/refused). These values were
summed for each individual, creating an “ideological consis-
tency” scale ranging from −10 (liberal responses to every
question) to +10 (conservative responses to every question).
The study found that Americans have become increasingly
polarized from 1994 to 2014: individuals who previously held
mixed liberal and conservative positions on different issues
are increasing partisan and ideologically uniform. As shown
in Figure 10, this trend manifests a spreading of the empirical
distribution over time. Using the same parameter-space explo-
ration tools as above, I found the ISC model produced similar
patterns of polarization: a normal-like opinion distribution
midway through the simulation gradually spread as extremists
on both sides pulled centrists towards the periphery. It can
also reproduce more subtle dynamics, such as the leftward
shift of the kernel density estimate’s central peak from 1994
to 1999, then back to the right as a sharper peak from 1999 to
2004.
Discussion
How do social groups maintain a strong diversity of
opinions?
Psychological forces such as a commitment to strong opinions
or a drive to distinctiveness may oppose homogenizing social
influence and preserve strong diversity. When society contains
agents with heterogeneous intolerance, susceptibility, and
conformity, each individual is simultaneously pulled towards
centrism and extremism. If these forces are balanced, a strong
diversity of opinions emerges and remains stable through
time. Figures 4, 5, and 7 showed this diversity can take
the form of (a) a centrist party diversified by influence from
a few extremist, (b) two extremist parties with undecided
agents on the borders, and (c) geographically-isolated opinion
subcultures.
The maintenance of strong diversity is a novel result
in opinion change and cultural diffusion models based on
bounded confidence, which assume that agents influence one
another only if their opinion similarity is above an interaction
threshold [53, 7, 2, 3, 21, 22, 4]. Though this approximation
of intolerance has proved a useful first step in understanding
convergence vs. polarization, I argue that it is overly rigid:
people do not classify each others’ trustworthiness according
to a binary scheme. The ISC model assumes that social in-
fluence changes continuously with intolerance, commitment,
and context, and produces sustained, strong diversity under
multiple psychological and network conditions. This result is
intuitive, since societies do not converge to a single opinion
or diverge to two polar opposites, and is also quantitatively
plausible, as shown through empirical validation. Whenever
possible, agent-based modelers should move away from psy-
chologically and socially implausible assumptions and adopt
empirically-motivated cognitive heuristics: doing so will so-
lidify the model’s foundations and, as exemplified by this
study, produce more complex and realistic results.
Maintaining a diversity of opinions is important outside
the modeling community. Indigenous cultures dissolve in the
face of globalization as people substitute traditional languages
and practices for the norms of modern society. Corporations
fall prey to groupthink when individuals with original ideas
choose not to voice them. Political and religions groups be-
come polarized due to intolerance of dissimilar beliefs. To
promote cultural and ideological diversity, leaders must rec-
ognize that social influence is not the only force that drives
single-mindedness. They must recognize, not just concep-
tually but with the quantitative precision afforded by com-
putational models, the role of psychological heterogeneity,
personal commitment, and social context in destroying the
valuable resource of diversity.
Will subcultures of opinions survive in a well con-
nected society?
In the ISC model, communities of dissenters can survive
among globalized centrism or extremist competition in two
circumstances. In a tolerant or conformist society, the push
towards centrism rapidly homogenizes most agents, but leaves
a few intolerant or committed agents on the ideological pe-
riphery. When intolerant agents who hold opposing beliefs
live together, they reject the opposite perspective so strongly
that they become extreme despite centrist influence, as in
Experiments 3 and 5. Polarization spreads outward, leav-
ing cohesive extremist parties and undecided agents on the
neighborhoods’ borders. Densely clustered extremists resist
moderate influence; it seems that neither a centrist majority
nor an opposing extreme minority effectively moderates their
speech or prevents their polarizing influence. If left undis-
turbed, these individuals will either settle into small conflicted
communities or radicalize society.
In the second scenario, agents’ small social networks limit
communication, producing a larger number of semi-isolated,
cohesive, persistent communities. Communication is still
possible between such communities, but must travel through
bridging individuals whose influence is often overcome by
the group consensus. These communities cannot coalesce
when agents’ social networks are large; social influence, when
distributed over a large network, may cause either centrist
convergence or extremist takeover. These results imply that
(a) a lack of communication within society can encourage ide-
ological splintering in the same way that geographic barriers
facilitate speciation and genetic diversification, and (b) when
advances in communication technology put isolated cultures
into contact with the outside world, the inflow of globalized
ideas can overwhelm the distinct features of their culture. In
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Figure 10. The ISC model produces opinion dynamics that are consistent with the polarization of Americans’ political
opinions from 1994 to 2014. Blue and green lines are Gaussian kernel density estimates for the respective distributions. Data
reproduced from the Pew Research Center [52]
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reality, extremism often emerges in locations with limited
communication and access to external information. Although
networking extremists with new individuals has the potential
to spread radicalization, it also increases the probability that
extremists will find a bridge to more moderate attitudes that,
over time, persuades them to soften their beliefs, as occurred
in Experiment 6.
Does pluralistic ignorance affect societal opinion
change?
We assess others’ opinions through their expressions and use
that assessment to reevaluate our own beliefs. Experiment
2 showed that agents’ desire to conform can lead others to
mistakenly think that agreement exists in society, reverse the
process of opinion polarization, and bring an intolerant society
back to consensus. It also showed that when agents express
opinions with the goal of appearing distinct, no observable
consensus exists on any issue, and the false atmosphere of
extremism causes societal polarization. Social norms like
the desire to be distinct from the previous generation or to
conform to the community’s religious beliefs do have far
reaching effects on opinion change at the societal level; any
simulation which assumes agents have perfect information is
missing an important aspect of social communication.
Pluralistic ignorance appeared in simulations with nonlin-
ear opinion dynamics, spiking during the critical periods of
change in that society’s history, such as before stubborn ex-
tremist converted to centrism and when centrist experimented
with moderate expressions. One interpretation of these re-
sults is that long-term history is relatively predictable when
everyone communicates perfectly, but when social context en-
courages belief falsification, tensions between what is heard
and what is felt build until they are suddenly released. This
interpretation agrees with Kuran’s work on the role of pref-
erence falsification in authoritarian revolutions [41], and was
likely a contributing factor in the unexpected and rapid nature
of the arab spring [42].
Can the ISC model reproduce empirical opinion dis-
tributions and dynamics?
All models should be treated with skepticism until they have
been credibly validated with empirical data. The agreement
between Broockman’s data and the simulated opinion distribu-
tions shows that the model reproduces strong diversity. These
political opinion distributions are sometimes far from normal,
and may be non-symmetric or have few agents at the ideo-
logical center. Furthermore, the similarities between political
polarization in the Pew dataset and in the simulation shows
the model also captures certain features of opinion change, in-
cluding short-term centrist fluctuations and long-term societal
polarization. Overall, the validation experiments should be
seen as an existence proof of plausible diversity and dynam-
ics in the model, not as evidence of a calibrated simulation
capable of precisely predicting opinion change.
Conclusion
In this study, I examined the relationship between the psy-
chosocial forces driving opinion change and the resulting
distributions, dynamics, and topologies of opinions across so-
ciety. This research extends previous studies in computational
opinion dynamics by expanding the psychological depth of
agents to include previously unstudied forces. Through a se-
ries of computational experiments, I showed that networks
of heterogeneous agents will interact to produce (a) distribu-
tions of opinions that match political opinion data (b) opinion
subcultures, and (c) trend-setting pluralistic ignorance. These
results are significant advances in the study of macroscopic
opinion change and suggest that modest increases in the com-
plexity of agent models can produce opinion dynamics that
align better with reality.
Many extensions of the ISC model are possible. People ac-
tively promote their opinions at rallies or online, while others
join organizations that enforce their beliefs through coercion
and punishment. Introducing social mechanisms for these
behaviors would permit the study of collective action prob-
lems and suggest more specific strategies that leaders could
take to achieve desired patterns of opinion change. Another
extension would allow for dynamic social networks. Though
the social reach procedure captures important statistics of so-
cial networks, the people with whom we converse change
constantly. Introducing dynamic networking, possibly in an
expanded virtual environment, would permit a more complete
study of how opinions change in a society dominated by social
media. I would also like to compare opinion geography and
pluralistic ignorance to empirical data.
I contend that empirically-accurate patterns of opinion
change only emerge when agents act according to plausible
rules, and that modelers must expand the depth of agents’ so-
cial cognition to explain complex social phenomenon. This is
best achieved by endowing agents with human-like cognitive
architectures capable of affecting perception, memory, emo-
tion, attention, and communication. Several opinion change
models have already incorporated neurally-inspired mecha-
nisms to great effect [54, 55]. Recent advances in neural
engineering suggest that building agents with artificial brains
may soon be possible [56]. In future work, I plan to incorpo-
rate such artificial intelligences into social simulations.
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